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Turning men into machines?
Turning men into machines? Scientific management, industrial 
psychology & the 'human factor'
Maarten Derksen
Theory & History of Psychology
University of Groningen
m.derksen@rug.nl
'We are not mere machines; we are human beings, and protest against being discussed and 
considered as coequal with machinery.' (Duncan, 1911, p. 383)
'The human factor cannot be ignored in the industries.' (Frey, 1913, p. 300)
Introduction: Management and the labor problem
The introduction of technological thinking to shop management by Frederick W. Taylor 
spurred the articulation of what was sometimes called 'the human factor'. Taylor's inclusion of 
workers in the ambit of his scientific management – the exact way they performed their job, how 
they worked together and with their machines, how, when and how much they were paid – raised 
the question whether one could treat people on a par with the machines in the shop, as Taylor 
appeared to be doing. To bolster their position, proponents as well as critics of scientific 
management formulated ideas about the human factor, and in particular about what makes people 
different from or similar to machines. Although the debate was at times almost philosophical, the 
point was always practical. How should men and machines work together? Are workers becoming 
the 'living appendages' of machines, as Marx had said? And how should the work in factories of 
ever increasing size be managed? What sort of practice should that management be? Is it a kind of 
Turning men into machines?
engineering? If not, what is it then? At issue, in other words, were the relations between workers 
and machines as well as the relations between the various people in the shop (owner, managers, 
foremen, workers), and how these relations should be governed.
Psychologists, starting with Walter Dill Scott and Hugo Münsterberg, succeeded in 
positioning themselves as the experts of the human factor, and their instruments and expertise as the
necessary complement of Taylor's psychologically flawed system. Traces of this boundary work can
still be found. For example, Thomas Hughes sides with Taylor's critics when he writes that 'Taylor 
tried to systematize workers as if they were components of machines', judging him to have been 
'naïve in his judgments about complex human values and motives' (Hughes, 2004, p. 187). Ludy 
Benjamin and David Baker similarly state that Taylor ignored 'human issues', issues that were 'the 
domain of psychology' (Benjamin & Baker, 2004, p. 130). John Benjafield compares Taylor and 
Elton Mayo, writing that 'Taylor's focus was on individual behavior seen as a collection of 
individual bodily movements, while Mayo's focus was on behaviour as determined by the quality of
one's interpersonal relationships' (Benjafield, 2005, p. 138). I will argue that such contrasts ignore 
on the one hand the human factor in Taylor's thinking, and early industrial psychologists' 
mechanistic view of the worker on the other. In some ways, Taylor's ideas about the worker's mind 
and about the right way for managers and workers to work together, were similar to the 'Human 
Relations' approach that started making its name in the 1930's, long after Taylor had died. For their 
part, early industrial psychologists presented themselves as human engineers, offering techniques to
measure and manipulate the mind of the worker. These developments are better understood if we do
not take the 'human factor' as a given, ignored by Taylor but gradually uncovered by psychologists. 
The history of management from Taylor to Human Relations is not one of progressive 
humanization, but rather one of successive redefinition and realignment of the human and 
mechanical factors of production and their management. The way in which the human factor was 
conceptualized, in particular how it was similar to or different from machines, developed in close 
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connection with ideas about its management, focussing on the question whether management was a 
form of engineering. In my interpretation of this history, I will revisit well-known terrain. I draw 
mainly on Taylor's work and that of Lillian Moller Gilbreth and Mary Parker Follett, and on the 
Hearings regarding scientific management of the United States House of Representatives. The main 
focus will be the period between 1910 and 1920, during which the relation between men and 
machines dominated the discussion about labour and management.
When Taylor wrote his first essay on management, 'A piece rate system', he gave it the subtitle
'Being a step toward partial solution of the labor problem' (Taylor, 1972). American industry was 
rife with friction in the 19th century, and in the 1870s the term 'the Labor Problem' began to be used
to refer to the tensions between capital and labor, and the unrest – strikes, boycotts, violence – that 
they gave rise to (Kaufman, 2008, p. 58). Social relations on the shop floor were an important 
aspect of the labor problem. The growing scale of industry and the increasing mechanisation had 
separated the factory owners from the production process. On the shop floor, the foremen were the 
dominant figures, often de facto subcontractors. Many foremen abused their power by engaging in 
favoritism and 'driving', spurring on workers to a high pace with a combination of authoritarianism 
and physical force (Nelson, 1980, p. 8). Large scale industrial unrest often arose out of conflicts 
between foremen and workers. One approach to the solution of the labor problem was labor reform 
that focussed on improving the relations between employers and workers, and the working 
conditions of the latter. Such 'welfare management' could include measures ranging from the 
provision of a clean and safe working environment, to sport's clubs and cultural events, and pension
and insurance plans. Taylor's 'Piece rate system' fell into another approach to the labor problem, one
defended in particular by engineers, who targeted the restriction of output that they saw as the most 
pressing part of the labor problem. Taylor's essay, a paper he had presented to the American Society 
of Mechanical Engineers, proposed an improvement on the wage setting schemes that had been 
devised by Henry Towne and Frederick Halsey. Each of these three engineers based his ideas on the
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assumption that workers are primarily motivated by the desire to increase their wage, but their 
schemes were often rejected by workers, who still 'viewed the union as the proper antidote to the 
foreman's abuses' (Nelson, 1980, p. 16). 
Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856 – 1915) came from an upper middle class Philadelphia 
family. Although he passed Harvard's admissions examination, he had his eyes on engineering and 
became an apprentice pattern maker at a foundry – getting his hands dirty with the ordinary 
workmen, as he would later often remind his critics. In 1878 he moved to Midvale Steel in 
Philadelphia, where he soon became a 'gang boss', the start of a career in management. At Midvale, 
Taylor distinguished himself with his experimental attitude, leaving no element of the production 
process unexamined in search of improvements. Apart from such aspects as the proper tools and 
machine speeds, and the routing of materials and products through the shop, payment schemes and 
their influence on worker productivity had Taylor's particular attention. When he presented his 
'Piece rate system' to the ASME in June 1895, Taylor had become a management consultant, and the
enthusiastic reception of his paper brought new clients to him. In 1898 Taylor's fame and that of his 
management system got him a contract with the Bethlehem Steel Company in Philadelphia, his 
most important client yet. At Bethlehem, Taylor and his assistants had to grapple with the resistance
of both managers and workers to the changes that Taylor tried to introduce. Nevertheless, when he 
left in 1901, his authority fatally undermined by the constant obstruction, he could claim a number 
of successes. Moreover, high speed steel, an invention he had made at Bethlehem with his assistant 
Maunsell White, made them a fortune, and Taylor quit the consultancy business to become a full 
time propagandist for his own management system, leaving the consultancy to his disciples. 
The core of Taylor's shop management could be said to consist of four elements: a focus on 
individual workmen; a strict separation of the planning and the execution of work; the exact timing 
of the constituent parts, the elementary units, of a job; and finally his differential piece rate. The 
first two prepared the ground for the last two. According to Taylor, managing labor scientifically 
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required individualising it and concentrating its management in a dedicated department, workers 
generally being incapable of understanding the science behind their own work. With the work itself 
rendered calculable by analysing it into unit tasks performed by individual workers, one proceeded 
to measure the time it takes a 'first class man' to do a particular subtask (such as getting one 
shovelful of coal into the boiler), if necessary improving the efficiency of work by removing 
wasteful, unnecessary motions. By adding up the unit times for each job, Taylor then determined 
what the ideal performance of his workers was. Workers who performed at this level were 
guaranteed a piece wage set 30% to 100% higher than the average in the trade – those who failed 
were paid a wage somewhat below average. Because the resultant increase in productivity was 
higher than the increase in labor costs, the result was, in modern terms, a win-win situation – 
according to Taylor and his followers at least: higher wages, and lower relative labor costs.
Through Taylor's proselytizing and the consultancy work of associates like H.L. Gantt and C. 
Barth, the fame of 'Taylorism' continued to grow in the first decade of the 20th century. Although 
Taylor did not realize it himself at first, his ideas about management, and in particular the role of 
technical experts in organizing the processes in a factory, resembled the ideas of Progressive 
thinkers about the reform of society (Nelson, 1980, p. 169). The big breakthrough came in 1911, 
when the progressivist lawyer Louis Brandeis, representing before the Interstate Commerce 
Commission  a group of trade associations that opposed the rate increases that the railroads were 
threatening to introduce, made 'efficiency' the central theme in his case. Almost overnight Taylor 
became a public figure and 'scientific management', a catchy name devised at Brandeis' request, 
became a household word. An 'efficiency craze' that would last several years had begun.
Not everyone was enthusiastic about scientific management, however. The Eastern Rate Case,
as it became known, also galvanized the hostility towards efficiency measures that many workers, 
and their union representatives, harbored. Bonus and other wage systems in particular had long been
met with resistance, because they were seen as forms of 'driving' or 'speeding': once workers had 
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been tempted into higher productivity by some form of piece rate or bonus system, employers 
would often cut the rate, and then workers would have to keep up the same high pace in order to 
make their old, low wage. The unions 'abhorrence of rate-cutting was matched only by their distaste
for the “speed-up.”' (Nadworny, 1955, p. 24) For his part, Taylor was staunchly anti-union. 
Scientific management, he claimed, allowed to set tasks, working hours and wages in an objective, 
scientific fashion, and removed the need for unions and collective bargaining. With the spotlight on 
scientific management after the Eastern Rate Case, the unions mounted a counter-attack.
Workers and machines
It was Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, who led the charge. 
In February 1911, with the ICC about to rule on the rate increases, Gompers wrote the first of 
several vitriolic pieces against scientific management. In his editorial in the American Federationist
Gompers called it a 'machinery  to perfect the living machine' (Gompers, 1911a, p. 116). Two 
months later, in a longer essay reacting to the first installment of Taylor's 'Principles of Scientific 
Management' in American Magazine, he repeated the charge. Taylor wants to make 'high speed 
automatic machines' out of workers, and fit them into the shop as 'a cog or a nut or a pin in a big 
machine'. (Gompers, 1911b, p. 277) Gompers was not the first to employ this trope – a few months 
earlier naval constructor H.A. Evans had warned his fellow machinists that the Taylor-system 'is 
devised to make machines of them and cheap machines at that' (Evans, 1910) Both Gompers and 
Evans were probably inspired by Marx's characterization, in Capital, of the difference between 
manufacture and the factory. Whereas in manufacture the workers are part of a living organism, in 
the latter 'we have a lifeless mechanism which is independent of the workers, who are incorporated 
into it as its living appendage.' (Marx, 2007, pp. 461–462) Gompers had more clout with American 
workmen than Evans or even Marx (Gompers himself was not a Marxist) and it was his rhetoric that
set the tone for the controversy about scientific management. As the fame of Taylorism spread, the 
Turning men into machines?
charge that it reduces workers to machines seemed to follow in its footsteps. Alphonse Merrheim, of
the French Fédération des Méteaux denounced Taylor because 'the worker must become, he has 
become, an automaton' (cited in Bloemen, 1988, p. 55).1 The Dutch Jesuit J. van Ginneken, who in 
1917 took it upon himself to save Dutch catholics of the scourge of Taylorism, warned them that it 
treats the worker 'as a merely material machine, the sole purpose of which is to yield the highest 
production' (Ginneken, 1918, p. 8).  A young Kurt Lewin observed that there is something 
particularly capitalist about 'the way people are treated here not as subjects but as calculation 
factors, as if they are machines.'2 (Kurt Lewin, 1920, cited in John, Eckardt, & Hiebsch, 1989, p. 
10) The trope had two variants: sometimes it had the worker reduced to a machine, as in the 
examples above, sometimes the original, Marxian version was used, and the worker had been made 
part of a machine, as when John Frey of the Molders Union claimed that 'scientific management as 
applied to workmen moves with the smoothness of a well-oiled and perfected machine, in which 
each one performs his part with the accuracy of a mechanically and mathematically perfect tooth on
a gear wheel, when it meshes with the teeth of another wheel in transmitting power.' (Frey, 1913, p. 
297) The difference – machine or machine-part – was of no consequence in the discussion.
The element that distinguished men from machines, that which scientific management 
deprived the workers of, was articulated in many different ways. Gompers claimed that separating 
planning and execution robs the men of 'initiative' (United States Congress. House. Committee on 
Labor, 1911, p. 24), it is a system that 'preys upon the independence, the development, and the 
character of the worker' (1911, p. 27), his 'individuality, initiative and vitality' (Gompers, 1913, p. 
525). The AFL's vice-president James Duncan wrote, in the American Federationist, that a task or 
task-setter would rob him 'of an individuality and self-reliance and reduce me to an automaton.' 
(Duncan, 1911, p. 383) Apparently taking his cue from Gompers, Merrheim rued the fact that 'the 
personality, the intelligence, even the desires of the worker are destroyed'3 (cited in Bloemen, 1988, 
p. 54). Van Ginneken simply called it their 'soul'  (Ginneken, 1918, p. 22) but also pointed out that 
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workers were stripped of their 'free will' (1918, p. 32). Commenting in 1933 on Soviet Russia's 
appropriation of scientific management4, the philosopher and social activist Simone Weil still 
lamented the way it made living cogs out of skilled workers with freedom, intelligence and 
initiative (Weil, 1958, p. 10). All in all, it was a common criticism that Taylor's system stripped 
workers of their humanity and reduced them to machines, but what humanity consists in was 
formulated in a rather diffuse, although familiar set of terms such as intelligence, personality, 
initiative, freedom, soul and individuality. 
Scientific management, including the question of men and machines, soon became a federal 
matter. In April 1911 representatives of the machinists of the Rock Island arsenal came to 
Washington to protest against plans to introduce scientific management. Taylorism, they 
complained, is an attempt to speed up the worker to a 'terrific pace', by methods including 
'(s)tandardizing the movements of a workman, thus making an automaton of him.' (United States 
Congress. House. Committee on Labor, 1912, p. 1222) In response, the House of Representatives 
passed a resolution asking for an investigation. In the preliminary hearings,  Representative Irvin 
Pepper, who had introduced the resolution, stated that '(t)he government should not approve a 
system which reduces the laboring man to a mere machine' (United States Congress. House. 
Committee on Labor, 1911, p. 5). When later that year a strike broke out at the Watertown navy 
shipyard over the introduction of scientific management, the House set up a Special Committee to 
investigate 'the Taylor and other systems of shop management' (United States Congress. House. 
Committee on Labor, 1912). The committee, made up of Representatives William B. Wilson, 
William C. Redfield and John Q. Tilson, heard a long list of critics and proponents of scientific 
management, including Taylor himself. The charge that Taylor's system made machines out of 
workers had their special interest. Chairman Wilson in particular was convinced that Taylor's 
system makes 'the workmen nothing more nor less than human machines to carry out the 
instructions that other intelligence has evolved' (United States Congress. House. Committee on 
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Labor, 1912, p. 101)  
The mechanism and the essence of scientific management
Clearly, Taylor and his associates needed to defend their work against the charge that they 
reduced workers to machines. Taylor developed two strategies. In his 'Principles of scientific 
management', written around the time of the Eastern Rate Case, Taylor introduced an analogy: was 
the surgeon, trained to work with precise motions and according to strict procedures any less human
(Taylor, 1947a, p. 125)? When Wilson put the automaton criticism to him, Taylor used the same 
analogy: trainee surgeons have to do exactly as they are told, yet we don't consider them 
automatons. His associate Frank Gilbreth took the argument one step further. After publishing 
'Principles of Scientific Management', the progressive journal American Magazine received 
hundreds of letters from fascinated, but more often worried and indignant readers. Taylor delegated 
the task of answering them to Gilbreth, who wrote a Primer of scientific management.5 The Primer 
is written in question and answer form, and one of the questions is 'does it not make machines out 
of men?' (F. Gilbreth, 1912, p. 49). Is a highly trained sportsman or soldier a machine? Gilbreth 
asked in return. He is simply trained to perfection. If it means doing the work in the one best way, 
then yes, scientific management tries 'to induce men to act as nearly like machines as possible' (F. 
Gilbreth, 1912, p. 50). And such “machines” (Gilbreth appears to mock the charge) are paid 
handsomely for their efficiency. '(W)hether or not the men may be called machines, they fare better 
and profit more' (1912, p. 50).
 However, in the Hearings Taylor's main line of defense follows another strategy: emphasizing
a distinction between the 'mechanism' (Taylor, 1947b, p. 33) of scientific management and its 
'essence' (Taylor, 1947b, p. 7). Right from the start of his opening statement, Taylor takes great 
pains to convince the members that there is more to scientific management than mechanism and 
efficiency, that the precisely timed routine movements, the standardized tools, and the system of 
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payment that it is famous for, are only possible on the basis of a 'complete mental revolution' 
(Taylor, 1947b, p. 27). Taylor apologizes for sounding a little 'highfalutin' (Taylor, 1947b, p. 49), 
but the essence of Scientific Management lies in the 'atmosphere' surrounding it, the 'sentiments' 
accompanying it (Taylor, 1947b, p. 7). Science is one aspect of this essence: Scientific Management
does not consist in the specific techniques that are employed at any one time, and still less in the 
techniques that Taylor himself happened to have devised, but rather in the scientific attitude of 
which they are the result. If scientific experimentation proves that there is a better way to organize 
work, any technique will instantly be dropped in favor of it. Taylor has much more to say however 
about the other element of the essence of Scientific Management. This part of the mental revolution 
consists in workers, managers and employers substituting 'friendly cooperation and mutual 
helpfulness for antagonism and strife' (Taylor, 1947b, p. 30) Then even more than now, there was 
ample reason to be skeptical about the idea of friendship between factory owners and the men and 
women who work for them. Taylor himself treated the theme to some extent as a ploy, describing it 
in a letter to another witness as 'the most effective weapon that we have all of us found as a foil 
against inconvenient questions.' (cited in Kanigel, 2005, p. 477) It was a theme however that went 
back a long way in Taylor's work before the Hearings.6 Reading Shop Management, in which Taylor
first expanded his ideas about the differential piece wage into a comprehensive management 
system, one is struck by his empathic analysis of the social and psychological processes at work in 
industry. Ultimately, the reason why Scientific Management is necessary, is the tremendous waste in
industry, its inefficiency, and the root cause of that is soldiering, deliberately working at a slower 
pace than is possible. Soldiering proceeds from two causes, Taylor explains: from the workers' 
natural tendency to take it easy, which they have in common with everyone, but also from 'more 
intricate second thought and reasoning caused by their relations with other men, which may be 
called systematic soldiering.' (Taylor, 1947c, p. 30) Workers realize it is not in their interest to work 
harder than another for the same pay, and they also know (and if they don't, more experienced 
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colleagues will tell them) that employers will rarely reward higher production with more pay. If the 
work is done for a piece wage, the rate will be cut when production goes up. Thus, workers 
carefully determine the precise pace of work that they can get away with, and make sure their 
employer remains convinced it is the maximum pace, by disciplining whoever exceeds it. To break 
this monopoly, the manager must employ time studies to determine the proper pace of work, but the
essence of scientific management lies not in the use of the stopwatch, but in the relations between 
managers and workers. One can distinguish three aspects: cooperation, friendship, and teaching.
Cooperation
Strife has been the main organizing principle in industry, according to Taylor. Employers want
low labor costs, workers want high wages, and from the apparent incompatibility of these two 
interests the main traits of contemporary industrial life follow: labor unions and strikes, soldiering 
by the workers, wage cutting by the employers, driving by the foremen. This strife is inefficient, but
it is also unnecessary. Low labor costs and high wages are not incompatible at all. If the work is 
done in the scientifically determined most efficient way, the employer can pay high wages to fewer 
workers and still raise production, and the worker can earn more without being driven to 
exhaustion. Once they realize this, employers and workers can shift their attention from dividing the
surplus to increasing, hand in hand, the size of the surplus.
Friendship
This principle of profit through peace cannot exist by its rationality alone. It has to go deeper 
than mere calculation. There must be real friendship between employers, managers, foremen and 
workers to make Scientific Management work. '(S)mall acts of personal kindness and sympathy' 
work wonders to 'establish a bond of friendly feeling' (Taylor, 1947c, p. 184), but companionship is 
sustained to an important degree by 'daily intimate shoulder to shoulder contact' (Taylor, 1947a, p. 
27).7 Although scientific management pulls apart the thinking and doing of labor and has them 
embodied in different people, these people (managers and workers) should be together on the shop 
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floor as much as possible. '(M)ore than all other causes, the close, intimate cooperation, the constant
personal contact between the two sides, will tend to diminish friction and discontent' (Taylor, 1947a,
p. 143). On the shop floor, managers and workers perform a precisely choreographed dance, the 
actions of the one dovetailing with those of the other. On the one hand, this close cooperation 
requires good relations, but on the other hand in such circumstances 'it becomes practically 
impossible to have a serious quarrel' (Taylor, 1947b, p. 45) 
Essential to the relations between management and workers is honesty. In the old days in 
industry, deception and deviousness reigned in the battle between employers and workers. If 
workers knew there was a quicker way to do a job, they would never tell management, and 
employers could not be trusted to keep their promises and not cut piece rates at their own 
convenience. Taylor, on the other hand, tells the manager always to be 'perfectly straightforward' 
(Taylor, 1947c, p. 176) with the men. Time and motion studies should preferably be done openly, by
fair-minded men, with full consent of the workers. Once a differential piece rate is set, it must be 
religiously adhered to. In return, the manager may expect fairness from the workers. And indeed, as 
long as the management does not engage in 'sneaking business' (Taylor, 1947b, p. 264), the men 
will cooperate honestly. Such is human nature.
Teaching
To bring about the mental revolution on which scientific management is based, the manager 
must be an orator and a teacher. Long passages in Taylor's works are devoted to descriptions of how
a shop should be converted to scientific management. The technical, mechanical part of this process
is a relatively minor concern. It is the mental part, winning over the minds of workers, owners and 
managers, that makes it such a difficult and protracted affair – one that may take years to complete. 
Both employers and workers must come to see the benefits of the new system, despite the 
drawbacks it may at first sight appear to have. Convincing the employers is a matter of patient 
explanation, but the rhetoric for the workers is built primarily on 'object lessons'. One should start 
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by converting one man to the new system. Some force may be required at this point: the worker is 
given the choice to cooperate or leave. Only when this man has learnt to work in the new way, and 
has realized that it pays to cooperate with management under its regime, can one introduce other 
workers to it, one by one. Once about a fourth to a third of the workers have been over, the tide will 
rapidly turn, but it is imperative not to rush at first.
Although object lessons are the main rhetorical instrument, there is nevertheless a lot of talk 
involved in changing the minds of the workers. Taylor's preferred rhetorical form for this 'difficult 
and delicate task' (Taylor, 1947c, p. 182) is the one to one conversation, in which the characteristics 
and the advantages of the system are patiently explained, and the worker has the chance to ask 
questions. A lot comes down to the precise way the men are addressed. Taylor's favorite example 
was his conversation with 'Schmidt', a worker who was to be taught the scientific way of handling 
pig iron. In the talks he held in his mansion for entrepreneurs, engineers, and politicians, he would 
reenact the scene complete with imitations of Schmidt's mental sluggishness and Pennsylvania 
Dutch accent ('Vell, I don't know vat you mean').8
More talk is required in the instruction that is an integral part of Taylorism. With planning and
execution separated, it becomes essential to communicate the ideas of the planners to the workers, 
so that they will execute the job in the manner and time that has been scientifically determined for 
it. Specially assigned 'functional foremen' teach each worker the proper way of doing a job, find out
what's wrong when their production falls behind, encourage them and discipline them if necessary. 
Time and again Taylor emphasizes that it is the responsibility of management to not only select the 
best worker for each task, but also to train and develop them to do the work as required. 'It is only 
when we fully realize that our duty, as well as our opportunity, lies in systematically cooperating to 
train and to make this competent man, instead of in hunting for a man whom some one else has 
trained, that we shall be on the road to national efficiency.' (Taylor, 1947a, p. 6)
To an important extent, Taylor's discourse about the essence, the atmosphere of scientific 
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management was mere talk. Historian Daniel Nelson (1980) has pointed out that in practice Taylor 
was not much interested in personnel management, had a strong authoritarian streak in the way he 
dealt with his workers, and preferred to consider them in terms of the amount of 'foot-pounds' of 
work they could be coaxed to do for a certain wage.9 Selection and training were of little actual 
importance, or took the form of 'weeding out the unfit' and disciplining the slow and lazy. Nelson 
however has also shown that something similar is true of the 'mechanism' of scientific management:
that too remained to some extent mere theory. What was implemented of it in practice did not differ 
much of the 'systematic management' that was already widespread. The measures that were 
introduced under the flag of scientific management often did not include time study, for instance. 
Taylorism was significant first and foremost as an idea. In this respect the 'mental revolution' was 
no different from time study or the differential piece wage. Nonetheless, Taylor's defense of 
scientific management in his testimony at the Hearings was not successful. Rep. Wilson was not 
impressed by the comparison of a scientifically managed worker with a surgeon. The point is not, 
he said, that trainee surgeons, like workers under scientific management, are taught the current best 
practices. If they were scientifically managed, surgeons would not even be allowed to perform a 
diagnosis or determine for themselves the best way to operate; they would be given an instruction 
card from the surgeon in chief and be expected to follow it to the letter.10 In its final report the 
Committee underscored the distinction between people and machines: 'A machine is an inanimate 
thing – it has no life, no brain, no sentiment, and no place in the social order. With a workman it is 
different. He's a living, moving, sentient, social being (…) He would be less than a man if he did 
not resent the introduction of any system which deals with him in the same way as a beast of burden
or an inanimate machine.' (United States Congress. House. Committee on Labor, 1912, p. 3 
[Report])11 Moreover, the Committee gave Taylor's fancy idea of a 'mental revolution' short shrift, 
arguing that a spirit of collaboration is 'too variable and insubstantial a basis upon which to rest the 
material welfare of the wage worker.' (United States Congress. House. Committee on Labor, 1912, 
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p. 4 [Report])
Lillian Moller Gilbreth's psychology of the human factor
At the time the controversy over scientific management broke out, the discourse about 
industry already contained a term that indicated the role of labor in production as opposed to 
machinery: the 'human factor' or 'human element'12 (Kaufman, 2008, p. 69). If one needed to point 
out for example that industry depends on workers, not just on machines, or that human labor is 
more important than machinery, one could refer to the 'human factor'. Although he didn't use the 
term 'human factor' himself, Gompers' charge that Taylor made machines out of men dovetailed 
with a distinction that was already in place. Others explicitly articulated Taylor's faults in term of 
the human factor: Taylor overlooked the human element because he didn't appreciate the 
sensibilities and expertise of the workers (Anonymous, 1972), because he preferred automatons to 
skilled men (Peck, 1911), and considered workers as merely mechanical parts of the machinery of 
production (Frey, 1913). The human factor came to stand for the wide array of aspects that 
distinguished labor from machinery, men from machines, and that was ill served or even effaced by 
scientific management. Scientific management's perceived shortcomings regarding the human 
factor offered an opportunity for psychologists looking to develop psychology as a practical 
science. To increase efficiency in industry, it is necessary to consider not just the 'mechanical side of
production', but also human efficiency, stated Walter Dill Scott, and this requires psychological 
study of the human factor (Scott, 1911, p. 3). Scientific management is useful when dealing with 
routine work, but it 'has done little for men whose welfare depends upon judgment' because they 
work in positions of responsibility (Scott, 1911, p. 255). Two years later, Hugo Münsterberg wrote 
that he believed the principles of scientific management would 'prove of lasting value' 
(Münsterberg, 1913, p. 50), but that he deplored its 'helpless psychological dilettantism' (1913, p. 
56). 'The theorists of scientific management seem to think that the most subtle methods are 
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indispensable for physical measurements, but for psychological inquiry nothing but a kind of 
intuition is necessary.' (1913, p. 53) Others followed his example. Whether they called their field 
psychotechnics or industrial psychology, when they first entered the domain of industry 
psychologists articulated their approach and skills in relation to scientific management, though not 
all as negatively as Münsterberg. In Lillian Moller Gilbreth psychology even had a representative 
who identified with scientific management. She believed that psychology and scientific 
management were quite compatible, that 'Scientific Management as laid down by Mr. Taylor 
conforms absolutely with psychology' (quoted in Lancaster, 2004, p. 120).
With her husband Frank Gilbreth, Lillian Moller (1878-1972) formed an efficiency team that 
was a considerable force in scientific management. In their work together Moller Gilbreth 
complemented her husband's energetic, practical attitude with solid methodological and theoretical 
expertise, and did much, if not most of the writing. Their work focused on the movements of the 
worker, rather than on the pace of work. Applying motion studies to bricklaying had been a 
longstanding interest of Frank, and Bricklaying System, written by Lillian but credited to Frank, 
appeared in 1909 (Lancaster, 2004, p. 95). By that time they had met Taylor and had been taken up 
into his circle of associates. They would remain on the periphery however. Taylor was ambivalent 
about Frank, didn't entirely trust him, but considered him useful because of his considerable 
rhetorical talent. Moreover, the Gilbreths' efficient system of bricklaying became a staple of Taylor's
own propagandistic efforts. Frank considered Taylor 'a very great man' (Lancaster, 2004, p. 107) but
didn't yield to his authority. To Taylor's increasing chagrin, the Gilbreths presented motion studies 
as an improvement on time studies. Lillian on her part never liked Taylor and had her doubts about 
the scientific character of his ideas. In 1914 Taylor had enough of their independent attitude and 
excommunicated them from the movement. The Gilbreths, who in 1912 had started a scientific 
management consultancy firm, were on their own, and began to cultivate an image of 'the good 
exception': scientific management, but with an eye for 'the human factor' (Lancaster, 2004, p. 149).
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Lillian's work on the psychology of management was an essential part of the Gilbreths' 
specific brand of scientific management. After getting to know scientific management through 
Frank, she had chosen to do a doctorate in educational psychology, reasoning that it offered a way 
into professional management and would give her expertise in an aspect that people like Taylor 
tended to neglect (Lancaster, 2004, p. 111). Taylor in fact was so impressed by her work on the 
psychology of management that he mentioned it in his keynote speech to the 1910 conference of the
ASME and the British Institution of Mechanical Engineers (Lancaster, 2004, p. 115). Berkeley 
however denied her the PhD degree because she hadn't spent the last year of her doctoral program 
on campus. She decided to publish the book and look for another institution.13 At the request of its 
publisher, Moller Gilbreth published The Psychology of Management as 'L.M. Gilbreth', so as not to
hurt sales by divulging it was written by a woman (Lancaster, 2004, p. 125). There is a sad irony in 
this, as she would arguably become more important in the history of psychology and management 
than Frank Gilbreth, but also in the light of the importance she assigns in her book to individuality. 
In frequently extravagant terms Moller Gilbreth impresses on the reader the importance of 
recognizing and acknowledging each worker's unique personality, making sure that the work he 
does is adapted to it, and arranging the processes in the shop in such a way that the personalities of 
the workers are allowed and encouraged to develop to the full. Unlike Münsterberg and most other 
psychologists of her day, Moller Gilbreth however felt no need to contrast scientific management 
and Psychology, in fact '(t)he psychological element of Scientific Management is the most 
important element,' (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 20) as it is built on the recognition of the individual, 
not just as an 'economic unit', but also as a personality (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 19) Moller Gilbreth
made the core of scientific management psychological.
Moller Gilbreth repeatedly addresses the charge that scientific management reduces workers 
to machines. This is not so, she counters; on the contrary, it encourages and helps the worker's 
personality to develop. It starts with careful, scientific selection, which assures that each worker is 
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perfectly suited for the work he does. '(F)ar from being "made machines of," men are selected to 
reach that special place where their individuality can be recognized and rewarded to the greatest 
extent.' (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 32) Once in that 'special place', each worker should regularly 
receive a record of his output, preferably relative to others, encouraging a feeling of personal 
responsibility, fostering competition, and impressing upon him that he is an individual, not an 
anonymous member of a gang. Again, '(t)his chance to be an individual, or personality, is in great 
contradistinction to the popular opinion of Scientific Management, which thinks it turns men into 
machines.'14 (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, pp. 36–37) The effect is even greater if the worker makes his 
own records, which requires him to be 'conscious every moment of the time exactly where he 
stands' (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 40) and thus creates self-knowledge. Somewhat counter-intuitively,
the standardization of work-processes that is so typical of scientific management also supports and 
strengthens individuality. It conserves the mental energy of the worker and allows him to focus on 
the parts of the job that are novel. He can then use his initiative to come up with a good way of 
standardizing them.15 In fact, Moller Gilbreth carries on, since standards are a way of externalizing 
memory, an ability that distinguishes us from the lower animals, therefore those who object to 
standardization apparently want to turn the worker into an animal. Against all appearances, 
'(s)tandards prevent men from becoming machines'. (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 177) 
Moller Gilbreth thus translated the human element, that which distinguishes us from 
machines, into a psychological factor. What had been a diffuse set of terms in the criticism leveled 
at Taylor – brain and intelligence, initiative, free will, personality, soul – she articulated as one 
factor, individuality, which could be scientifically measured and managed with the help of 
psychology. Scientific management that is based on psychological laws and principles selects the 
individual best suited for each task and organizes the shop in such a way that each individual is 
enabled and encouraged to develop to the full. Thus, Moller Gilbreth puts forward psychology as a 
mediator between the mechanical and the human: by employing psychology's knowledge of the 
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laws that govern 'the working of the mind' (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 2) one enables the worker to 
develop as an individual and be unlike a machine. Psychology connects the domain of causal laws 
with the world of feelings, morals and imagination, feeding the latter with its knowledge of the 
former.
Although it is individuality that makes us different from machines, there is a second theme in 
the book, that has less to do with individuality than with the relations between people. Moller 
Gilbreth adopts Taylor's emphasis on teaching and gives it a psychological basis.16 Teaching is 
ubiquitous, in industry as well as in the academic world, and it must be made the object of scientific
management. '(E)very man going out into the world needs all the knowledge that he can get as to 
the working of the human mind in order not only to give but to receive information with the least 
waste and expenditure of energy' (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 2). To make teaching efficient, it must be
based on psychological principles. The 'disciplinarian', one of eight kinds of foremen that Taylor 
had distinguished, must 'apply, at least unconsciously, and preferably consciously, the known laws 
of psychology, if he wishes to be successful.' (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 71) The laws and principles 
in question have a familiar ring to them: it is important, for example, to motivate the worker by 
explaining why he needs to know what he is taught, and it is crucial to gain his commitment by 
making him feel that he is 'a part of what is taught' (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 221), that he is being 
taught the laws underlying his own experiences. Moller Gilbreth combines such motivational advice
with an emphasis on teaching the right habits, the psychological importance of which she supports 
by referring to William James. As in James' famous chapter of the Principles of Psychology, habit 
connects the structure of the brain with morality and a good and just society. On the one hand, the 
formation of proper work habits always starts with teaching the right motions (rather than abstract 
theory), resulting among other things in a fully developed brain (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 268), but 
on the other hand the benefit also lies on a higher plane, all the way up to the education of reason 
and will, the happiness of the worker, and a Taylorist 'spirit of coöperation' (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p.
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238).
Engineering and management
Between 1914 and 1920, the furor over scientific management gradually died down. Union 
resistance waned when more workers actually experienced scientific management and found out 
that time studies, touted by Taylor as the central part of the system, were in practice a minor 
element, most of the attention going to better management of machinery, routing, tools, shop lay-out
etcetera. As Nelson has discovered, this had been true of scientifically managed shops all along 
(Nelson, 1974). The House report of 1912 recommended that time study should only be done with 
the consent of the workers, but did endorse standardization, systematization, and other efforts to 
eliminate waste in industry and raise efficiency. Scientific management, minus time studies, was 
reintroduced in the U.S. arsenals. Meanwhile, with the passionately anti-union Taylor having died in
1915, his disciples sought closer links with union leaders. Taylor's pupil Morris Cooke edited a 
collection of essays together with Samuel Gompers and Fred Miller, the president of the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers, in which 'the scientists of industry and the representatives of 
organized workers' together considered the problems of industry (Cooke, Gompers, & Miller, 1920, 
p. 7). In the process, the 'workers are human beings, not machines' issue largely disappeared from 
the discussion of scientific management, instead becoming part of the common sense topoi of work 
on which Chaplin for example drew for Modern Times. At the same time, the dominance of 
engineers in management was gradually broken, when psychologists and accountants began to 
compete for the same ground.
It would be tempting to interpret this process of gradually diminishing influence of engineers 
and a growing role of psychologists as the humanization of management, culminating in the 'human
relations' approach of the 1930's. The more psychologists had a say in management, it appears, the 
better the 'human factor' was represented, the more 'humane' management became and the less like 
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engineering.17 One reason why such a story would be incorrect, is the psychological nature of some 
of Taylor's ideas. He never used the term 'psychology', but the mentality – the motives, feelings and 
thinking – of workers were of great interest to him. To say that Taylor was psychologically naive 
and Münsterberg and the psychologists who came after him increasingly sophisticated, is to 
uncritically adopt the boundary work instituted by that same Münsterberg. If anything, Taylor's 
perspective on the mind of the worker was broader than that of many early industrial psychologists 
and psychotechnicians. Whereas they focused on the individual worker – his or her personal traits 
and capabilities, their exact measurement using psychological tests – Taylor was equally interested 
in the social processes on the shop floor and in the relations of workers and managers. Some of 
Taylor's ideas have a distinct 'human relations' character to them. In one of his favorite anecdotes, 
Taylor relates how his associate Sanford Thompson had reorganized the quality control in a factory 
producing ball bearings. The process had had a beneficial effect on the wellbeing of the 'girls' doing 
the inspecting. Not only could the work be done better, by fewer girls working shorter hours, it also 
raised their spirits: 'Each girl was made to feel that she was the object of especial care and interest 
on the part of the management, and that if anything went wrong with her she could always have a 
helper and teacher in the management to lean upon.' (Taylor, 1947a, p. 96) When the Hawthorne 
study revealed that workers restricted their output to a very precise level to maximize earnings 
while avoiding rate cutting, it replicated one of Taylor's basic insights into the causes of soldiering. 
The analysis of the group processes that underlie the phenomenon (Gillespie, 1991, p. 162 ff.) 
extended Taylor's, but did not contradict it
Rather than management becoming more psychological with the advent of psychologists like 
Moller Gilbreth and Münsterberg, it is more to the point to say that the mind of the worker became 
technologically constituted by the theories and instruments they introduced: it became a machine 
working according to definite laws, a machine that could be manipulated using standardized 
techniques, and the operating parameters of which could be determined using scientific instruments.
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Taylor already made some steps in this direction. In the Principles, he wrote that management 
should not only include the scientific study of work (task time, tools, etc.), but also 'the accurate 
study of the motives which influence men' (Taylor, 1947a, p. 119), because there too there exist 
laws, even though human beings are very complex. Psychologists took it upon themselves to 
formulate the laws that governed the mind and behavior of the individual worker. What Moller 
Gilbreth writes about mind and management is not all that different from Taylor, except that she 
supports each claim with a reference to a psychologist's theory. In one important respect, however, 
her approach is different from Taylor's. Whereas Taylor had distinguished the mechanism of 
scientific management from its 'essence', the system from the atmosphere of cooperation and 
camaraderie that formed its heart as well as its precondition, Moller Gilbreth made the relational, 
emotional and moral aspects of management an integral part of the system, and grounded them in 
the firm reality of psychological laws. She applied the precept of standardization, for example, not 
only to the actions of individual workers, but also to 'the relationships between the foreman, the 
manager, and the worker' (L. M. Gilbreth, 1921, p. 179). As Moller Gilbreth's biographer Jane 
Lancaster puts it: 'Lillian, like all the scientific management experts, wanted a predictable and 
controllable labor force and was prepared to use her psychological expertise to get it.' (Lancaster, 
2004, pp. 153–154) If anything, management was more like engineering in the theories of Scott, 
Münsterberg and Moller Gilbreth than it was in Taylor's work.
Around the Great War, engineering was a common term for the work of psychologists 
(Brown, 1992). Applied psychology stands to experimental psychology as engineering to physics, 
Münsterberg (1908) proclaimed18, and many expressed the analogy in terms like 'human 
engineering' and 'mental engineering'. In an era when the engineer epitomized the ability to 
construct a better society for all, such terms conveyed the sense of professionalism that applied 
psychology required. '(P)sychologists capitalized on the hard-won reputation of the engineer as a 
practical man of affairs' (Brown, 1992, p. 108). Thus, with more psychology, management did not 
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immediately become less like engineering. It widened the field of application of what was still seen 
as a technical practice. Complementing management with a concern for the 'human factor' did not 
make it more 'humane' as long as the human factor was still a kind of machine. It is true that the 
mechanical model of the human factor was increasingly challenged in the interbellum, and that 
psychology became an important source of resistance against mechanicism. The British industrial 
psychologist C.S. Myers for example, who had been enthusiastic about scientific management in 
1918 (C. S. Myers, 1918), soon began to protest against its mechanistic approach (C.S. Myers, 
1923). During the decade that followed, psychology channeled approaches into management that 
were incompatible with an engineering model, including instinct psychology (Drever, 1929) and 
Gestalt psychology.19 Psychologists began to accuse scientific management of ignoring the 
complexity and uniqueness of people and organizations, and professed the impossibility of 
analyzing work and workers into their constituent parts. Thus, the increasing influence of 
psychologists on management thought and practice certainly developed the human factor into a 
much more diverse and complex aspect of work and management than it had been in Taylor's days, 
but the move away from mechanicism and engineering in management was the result of a change in
psychology rather than being caused by the entry of psychology into management per se.
Managing freedom and responsibility
The increasing influence of psychology on management theory and practice continued a 
development that Taylor had started: psychologists extended the reach of science on the shop floor 
to include the individuality and the social relations of the workers. The influx of psychologists into 
management was consequential, because it brought the human factor in industry under the aegis of 
science, taking management further in a direction that Taylor had already vaguely indicated. An 
arguably more important turn therefore happened when the limits of the reach of science and 
engineering in industry were articulated. This happened when freedom and autonomy, rather than 
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individuality, became the hallmarks of the human factor. Of the diffuse set of terms that had been 
employed to mark the human factor, freedom and autonomy had been used to differentiate men 
from machines, but even more to distinguish them from slaves. Didn't the worker under scientific 
management, forced to follow the instructions on an instruction card to the letter, his every 
movement precisely prescribed, lose his freedom and become a slave? The stopwatch, the object of 
much hate of the molders and machinists in the Hearings, was compared to the slave driver's whip. 
(United States Congress. House. Committee on Labor, 1912, p. 18) Taylor strenuously denied the 
charge: the foreman in scientific management is not a 'nigger driver', he is a teacher, a friend even, 
there to help the worker do the job in the best possible way, earning him the most money (Taylor, 
1947b, p. 59).20 Taylor emphasized that the system is sovereign in scientific management. If it had 
been objectively determined that the job had to be carried out in such a way in so much time, then 
everyone, including foremen and management, had to obey. Yet to workmen it was clear that 
science was a tool in the hands of management and employer, not vice versa. In practice, the boss 
remained sovereign, not science.
After the War there was a growing consensus that the old distribution of power in industry 
was unacceptable to workers and, moreover, did not 'work'. In the essays that Cooke, Gompers and 
Miller collected in 1920, the key words that describe 'the human factor as the heart of industry' 
(Cooke et al., 1920, p. iii) are freedom, cooperation, responsibility and democracy, and the authors 
emphasize that only by respecting workers' freedom and encouraging them to assume responsibility 
for their work can productivity really be raised.21 As 'labor manager' A.J. Todd put it, to really 
motivate workers to produce more they need to be able to assume 'industrial citizenship', and this 
means 'responsibility and some measure of self-determination and self-expression.' (A.J. Todd, in 
Cooke et al., 1920, p. 31) In the words of Gompers: 'Liberation is the answer, and only through 
liberation can there be a solution of our problems.' (Gompers, in Cooke et al., 1920, p. xii) An early 
example of the style of management that such a conception of the human factor requires is 
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described in Mary Parker Follett's 1925 paper 'The giving of orders' (Follett, 1982a).
Parker Follett's interest in the social processes in organizations arose from her study in 
political science (she graduated from Radcliffe in 1898) and her experiences in social work in 
Boston.22 She started to express her ideas in lectures and in 1918 published a book, The New State, 
in which she presented self-government arising out of group processes as the solution to problems 
of government. Shifting her focus to business administration, she began to reflect on the role of 
managers in cultivating, rather than imposing, change in organisations. In her ideas on this subject 
the psychology of human motivation and interaction becomes an increasingly important subject. 
'The giving of orders', from 1925, is one of her best known lectures on the topic. At a time when 
instinct psychology was under fire from behaviorists, Parker Follett notes that the exaggerated 
interest in human instincts is giving way to a study of habits. Like Moller Gilbreth, she advocates 
creating habitual behavior patterns in workers. With such 'prepared-in-advance behavior patterns' 
one prepares the way for 'the reception of orders' which will release these behaviors (Follett, 1982a, 
p. 24). The subsequent reinforcement of the response completes the behaviorist scheme. However, 
Parker Follett warns, preparing in advance is not what psychologists take it to be, a tactic. People do
not like to be told what to do, they have a deep-seated wish to be self-governing. This instinct, in 
fact, is 'the very essence of human being' (Follett, 1982a, p. 33). A manager could only dispense 
orders in the way that psychologists envisage if it were a covert practice, otherwise employees 
would resist. 'If this prepared-in-advance idea were all that the psychologists think it, it would have 
to be printed privately as secret doctrine.' (Follett, 1982a, p. 32) Parker Follett's way to avoid the 
Scylla and Charybdis of 'bossism' and avoiding orders all together is to depersonalize the order.23 
Rather than the manager giving an order, inevitably eliciting resistance, the order is located in the 
demands of the situation, and the manager must engage the employee to discover it together. By 
putting everyone, manager as well as worker, 'under the situation' (Follett, 1982a, p. 33) the 
problem of resistance to authority is overcome. If it is the situation rather than the boss that rules, 
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one may expect employees to follow orders and take responsibility for their work as well. 
Obedience and liberty come together under the 'law of the situation' (Follett, 1982a, p. 35) Thus, 
Parker Follett took Taylor's insistence on the sovereignty of the system, and developed it further 
into the 'law of the situation'. Not in the interest of science, as in Taylor's case, but to accommodate 
the essential autonomy of workers.24 Control must give way to self-control, distributed over the 
whole company. 'To get our affairs in hand, to feel a grip on them, to become free, we must learn, 
and practice, I am sure, the methods of collective control.' (Follett, 1937, p. 169) 
Engineering is not a term that fits well such a form of management as Parker Follett proposes.
In their calculations engineers certainly need to factor in resistance, but the friction they deal with 
does not arise from the fact that their machines are both expected to follow orders and supposed to 
be autonomous. That, at least, was not the state of the art in mechanical engineering in the 1920's.  
Locating orders in the situation is a paradoxical instrument to manage the paradoxical challenge of 
governing autonomous subjects. In comparison, scientific management has a very straightforward 
idea of control. Defending scientific management in his Primer, Frank Gilbreth argued that it may 
be so that under scientific management you have to do the work as the planners have determined, 
but at least you get a 'square deal', and not being lied to is also a kind of freedom (1912, p. 73). 
Although scientific management was in practice not free of deception (Taylor advised that time 
study was best done covertly if resistance was expected, for example), it is clear that this is a 
different idea of freedom than that of Parker Follett. For Taylor and his disciples, freedom, 
initiative, and independent thought had a place outside of the 'mechanism' of objectively timed, 
precisely coordinated tasks. Inside the system one had to do as the system required. It was a 
transparent, honest, 'square' deal. In Parker Follett's management on the other hand, freedom and 
obedience are brought together in an uneasy combination. In the process, the subject under 
management changes in step: from a being that shuttles between machinality and friendship, to a 
hybrid of freedom and responsibility, autonomy and order.
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Conclusion
Frederick Taylor is commonly portrayed as both psychologically naive and callous in his 
neglect of the human factor and in the way he treated workers as mere machines. Management only 
became humane with the arrival of psychologists on the scene. I have argued this is too simplistic a 
view, and uncritically repeats the rhetoric that early industrial psychologists like Münsterberg 
employed to position their profession. It assumes that the human factor is a given, that was ignored 
by Taylor and uncovered and defended by psychologists. However, to understand this part of the 
history of management one needs to look at the ways in which the human factor was variously 
articulated. Certainly, the core of Taylor's scientific management, its 'mechanism' as he called it, 
was indeed a largely mechanistic affair, in which workers functioned primarily as bodies propelled 
by rudimentary motives, performing repetitive, precisely engineered tasks. But Taylor also 
emphasized that around this mechanism there had to be an atmosphere of friendship, honesty and 
cooperation. Moreover, managing the mechanism involved selecting, developing and teaching 
workers, processes that psychologists were to claim expertise on. Although it is clear from the 
historical record that Taylor's 'mental revolution' was to a large extent window dressing, 'mere talk' 
rather than practice, the same is true of other aspects of scientific management. It doesn't change the
fact that at least in its theory, its principles, scientific management did formulate a mental side of 
shop floor management and industrial relations. On the other hand, the human factor that industrial 
psychologists articulated, beginning with Münsterberg, was as mechanical as the core of scientific 
management, albeit psychologically more complex, and managing the human factor psychologically
was proudly presented as a form of engineering. The decisive change in management away from the
mechanicism at the heart of scientific management was therefore not the rise of psychologists as 
experts of the human factor, but the articulation of freedom and responsibility as the essence of the 
human factor. Workers were not machines but human beings, not because they had feelings, 
intelligence or a soul (although they do), but because they would resist being treated as machines, 
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manipulated as cogs in a mechanism. They were free agents, demanding democratic rights and 
responsibilities. Parker Follett realized that governing such self-governing subjects required a new 
form of management. 
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